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Famine in Malawi: Causes and Consequences 
 
1.  Introduction: Legacy of food insecurity in Malawi 
Reports of a devastating famine in Malawi first surfaced as rumors whispered in rural 
areas in the country around October 2001. However, little was done by way of action. 
Government officials in Lilongwe and members of the donor community were hard 
pressed to believe or act on the problem even as civil society groups such as the Malawi 
Economic Justice Network (MEJN) and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 
began to present evidence supporting the reports coming from the countryside. 
Consequently, by the time the crisis in rural Malawi was finally publicized in February 
2002, famine and severe food insecurity were rampant: from January to April 2002, 
between 500 and 1,000 people died of hunger or hunger-related diseases in the southern 
and central regions of the country. These deaths contributed to making the famine one of 
the worst in living memory—more devastating than the drought of 1991/92 and even 
worse than the Nyasaland famine of 1949. Moreover in 2005, Malawi had another 
difficult year with more than 4.7 million out of a population of 12 million experiencing 
food shortages (Phiri 2005). This marked the sixth year in a row that the country had 
experienced some form of food shortage, with some commentators suggesting that this 
recent event may be “Malawi’s worst food crisis for a decade” (SOS News 2005).  
 
This paper will examine the causes of the 2002 famine as well as the greater context for 
the underlying vulnerability factors that left poor Malawians unable to cope with a 
negative production shock that was, in reality, less severe than the drought of 1991/92. 
An attempt will be made to assess both the ‘technical’ and ‘political’ reasons for the 
famine, and the related failure of the donor community to respond in a timely manner. 
This will be followed by a brief overview of the factors leading to further food insecurity 
in 2005. Finally, the paper will consider social protection measures in place in Malawi, as 
well as the potential policy gaps in this regard. 
  
2.  Malawi: Background and context 
Malawi is a small, land-locked country in southern Africa, with an estimated population 
of 12 million. With approximately 65 percent of its inhabitants living below the national 
poverty line and 28 percent in extreme poverty, it is one of the poorest countries in 
Africa. Health and social indicators in the country are also among the lowest on the 
continent. Infant mortality in 2000 was 134 per 1,000, compared with an average of 92 
for sub-Saharan Africa, and average life expectancy (37 years at birth) is declining due to 
the impact of HIV/AIDS, which in 1999 affected 16 percent of the adult population and 
31 percent of women in ante-natal care (Clay et al. 2003). The poor in rural areas are 
particularly affected by these indicators, as 90 percent of the population consists of 
subsistence farmers, who rely on the food they grow themselves for survival (Trócaire 
2005; ActionAid International 2006). Agriculture accounts for some 40 percent of GDP 
and its share of GDP has been increasing since the early 1990s with increasing stagnation 
of the industrial sector, as well as the public service sector. Malawi is heavily dependent 
on maize, its main food staple, which during a normal year accounts for about three 
quarters of calorie consumption for the population. This reliance on rain-fed agriculture   2
crops puts Malawi especially at risk in the event of variations in rainfall as well as 
commodity price shocks.  
 
With respect to disasters, Malawi’s experiences are often traced back to the 1991/92 
southern African drought that affected, in some way, over 6.1 million people. Disasters 
have continued to escalate, culminating with the devastating effects of the 2001/02 
famine. Indeed, between 1970 and 2006, Malawi experienced 40 weather-related 
disasters, though 16 of these occurred after 1990 (ActionAid International 2006). 
 
Figure 2.1 (Source: ActionAid International 2006: 3) 
 
 
The number of people affected has also increased substantially since 1990: before 2001, 
only nine districts in Malawi were classified as flood-prone, though in fact 16 districts 
were affected that very year and a further 14 in 2002. By the end of 2003, localized 
flooding had occurred in 22 districts (ActionAid International 2006). Evidence strongly 
supports the notion that increased incidences of droughts and floods may be exacerbating 
poverty levels, leaving many rural farmers trapped in a cycle of poverty and vulnerability 
(Phiri et al 2005).  
 
Figure 2.2 (Source: ActionAid International 2006: 3) 
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3.  The ingredients for hunger: risk and vulnerability 
The combination of heavy reliance on rain-fed agriculture and increasing frequency of 
natural hazards has resulted in particularly vulnerable livelihoods in Malawi, and more 
generally, in developing countries. In fact, the preceding three decades have seen an 
increase in both the frequency and destructive magnitude of natural hazards (Guha-Sapir 
et. al 2004). People in developing countries, in particular, are prone to suffer more from 
the effects of natural disasters as compared to their developed country counterparts, since 
losses for them tend to be greater when measured as a percentage of GDP (World Bank 
2004).  A regional disaggregation of the impacts of natural disasters further supports this 
point: for instance, the UNDP (2004) estimates that over the last two decades, low human 
development countries accounted for more than half of all reported casualties resulting 
from natural hazards, though these regions only represented a tenth of those exposed to 
such events. These figures sharply highlight the close correlation between the level of 
development and exposure to natural disasters. And more specifically, although the risk 
of destructive events is closely associated with natural elements such as geography, what 
turns a natural hazard into a disaster is often contingent on societal factors. By this logic, 
different societies would experience the same natural event with differing degrees of 
preparedness, thereby leading to radically different outcomes (Seck 2007). Risk 
therefore, determines the extent to which a society is potentially exposed to a natural 
hazard, whereas vulnerability determines its susceptibility to extensive damage.  
 
Vulnerabilities often arise as a result of political systems and unsustainable development 
policies that put people at risk. In the case of Malawi, poverty and vulnerability was 
already steadily inclining for several years as a consequence of an adverse combination 
of economic, climactic, demographic and political shocks and stresses. Indeed, the 
rapidly rising livelihood vulnerability of the predominantly rural population played a 
significant role in exacerbating the crisis. Contributing factors included: a) intensifying 
pressure on the land, compounded by a steady population growth; b) declining soil 
fertility associated with the lack of application of agricultural inputs; c) strictly limited 
off-farm and non-agricultural income generating opportunities; d) the continuing spread 
and impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, leading to a reduced labor force and increased 
household dependency ratios; e) government policies favoring urban populations and the 
business sector; and f) economic liberalization measures that have undermined farmers’ 
access to inputs and eliminated consumer subsidies and food price stabilization 
interventions. A combination of these factors placed the poorest and most vulnerable 
sections of the population at risk and in fact, it was this segment of the population that 
paid the highest price in terms of lives lost and destroyed livelihoods, leading to life-long 
destitution.  
 
4.  The anatomy of famine: causes, factors and explanations 
The immediate cause for the food crisis was erratic rainfall—localized flooding and 
waterlogging of fields—during February and March 2001, which reduced national maize 
production by 32 percent, from a record high of 2.5 million MT in the 1999/2000 season 
to 1.7 million MT in 2000/01 (Devereux 2002a; Frize 2002). The famine Early Warning 
System (FEWS NET) predicted a maize shortfall of 273,000 MT, but assumed   4
households would be able to buffer the deficit with carry-over stocks from the previous 
good production year. Moreover, the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MoA&I) 
believed that the so-called ‘high’ production of root and tuber production (cassava, sweet 
potatoes, Irish potatoes) in the same year would offset the dip in maize production and 
provide adequate, if not surplus, food
1 for the country. Moreover, Malawi’s Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) and the National Food Reserve 
Agency (NFRA) claimed to hold over 60,000 MT in maize stock at the start of the 
consumption year in April 2001.    
 
Given the divergence between the relatively positive initial projections from the 
government vis-à-vis available food stocks and the actual series of events that transpired 
in Malawi, the question of how a relatively small production shock resulted in a severe 
food crisis becomes crucial. It is evident now that the confluence of two sets of factors—
vulnerable livelihoods and weak institutions—resulted in turning what could have 
minimally been a natural hazard into a full-blown famine in 2002. Explanations for the 
famine fall into two categories: ‘trigger factors’ (livelihood shocks and response failures) 
and ‘underlying causes’ (factors which create vulnerability to livelihood shocks) 
(Emergency Nutrition Network 2003; Devereux 2002a). ‘Technical’ and ‘political’ 
failures have also been cited as contributing reasons for the famine. The ActionAid 
Malawi report (Devereux 2002a) attributes the disaster to the combination of both 
‘technical’ errors and political challenges. Poor early warning systems, market failures, 
structural poverty and inadequate infrastructure also contributed greatly to the crisis.  
 
4.1  The ‘technical’ explanation: production failure, information constraints, depleted 
food reserves and import bottlenecks 
This analysis highlights the role of a sequence of unexpected events, namely production 
failure, information constraints, a depleted food reserve, import bottlenecks and 
unaffordably high food prices in creating famine conditions in Malawi. While it was well 
understood that there was a shortfall in maize production in Malawi, the magnitude of 
this gap in food stores was underestimated by both the government and donors
2, due to 
methodological errors.
3 The resulting misguided attitude that Malawi was experiencing a 
‘maize deficit,’ but not an overall ‘food deficit’ persisted until early 2002 and most likely 
slowed the public response to the impending disaster (Devereux 2002a). Donors refused 
to recognize the severity of the crisis, arguing that people could still eat cassava and 
sweet potato even if maize was unavailable and went so far as to blame the “inflexible 
eating habits” of the Malawian population for the food stress that emerged in 2001. In 
fact, as Devereux (2002a) puts it: these events signal “failures of information, not 
stupidity by individuals obstinately choosing to starve rather than eat cassava…starving 
                                                 
1 Surplus of 437,775 MT in maize-equivalent terms. 
2 Maize production estimates were revised downwards three times during the 2000/01 season. The first set 
of estimates in February 2001 predicted a 15 percent drop from record harvests of 2.5 million MT in 
1999/2000. The second set, released in April 2001, put this deficit at 24 percent, due to flooding during 
February and March. Finally, in June 2001, a third-round estimate further downgraded production to 32 
percent below 1999/00 levels.  
3 Although the magnitude of the maize deficit was finally known by June 2001, official estimates still 
suggested that this deficit would at least be partially offset by a 30% increase in roots and tubers production 
(especially cassava) over the previous year. This figure was wrong and led to misplaced policy directives.    5
Malawians resorted to consuming pumpkin leaves, banana stems, even discarded sugar 
cane thrown on the street, reflecting the harsh reality that no food was available to them 
at all.”  
 
In the meantime, the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) had been sold
4, thereby paralyzing 
the government’s emergency response mechanism: it was unable to distribute food at the 
necessary time. Information asymmetries also marked the process, as the size of the SGR 
was never definitely known due to a lack of transparency. Indeed, there were allegations 
that the SGR “was being secretly emptied” on the advice of the IMF, to the extent that no 
maize was left in the reserve by the time decision-makers and donors finally recognized 
the scale of the problem in 2001.  
 
After it became known that there would be a maize deficit in June 2001, the Government 
of Malawi announced that it would offset some of the shortfall by buying and reselling 
220,000 MT of maize. It had wanted to purchase 70,000 MT locally and to import the 
remaining 150,000 MT. But the local purchase plan did not work: ADMARC entered the 
market late and found few sellers at its initial purchase price of MK 3/kg. Private traders 
had already bough what little maize was available from farmers and ADMARC’s low 
producer price did little to encourage sales. Moreover, ADMARC’s decision to adjust its 
buying price was taken very late and even with a price adjustment to MK 12/kg, sellers 
were scarce. Because of the decline in supply, as well as food marketing liberalization, 
maize prices jumped 10-fold from MK4/kg at harvest time (June 2001) to over MK40/kg 
(January 2002).  Even so, it was only after ADMARC had slowly purchased the 
prescribed 50,000 MT locally, was the import program expanded (Devereux 2002a). 
 
Further compounding the fatal delays were transport bottlenecks as food imports did not 
arrive on time due to congested roads, the diversion of food trucks to Zimbabwe and 
Zambia, a train derailment at Beit Bridge and capacity constraints at Nacala and Beira 
ports in Mozambique (Emergency Nutrition Network 2003). The fact that Malawi is 
land-locked makes it particularly vulnerable to transportation and trade bottlenecks. This 
often results in raising the price of importing commodities such as staple food. Because 
of these constraints, NFRA was only eventually able to purchase 134,000 MT of the 
promised 150,000 MT of maize, at an average price of US$245/MT. All the maize 
purchased from South Africa was expected to arrive at a rate of 50,000 MT/month, but 
this proved to be over-optimistic. If food stocks had arrived by December 2001, the 
famine might have been averted, however unfolding logistical problems led to fatal 
delays (Devereux 2002a). In reality, imports arrived at an average rate of 15,000 
MT/month, so that by April 2002, only 94,000 MT of maize had arrived in Malawi. In the 
end, the same floods that caused the negative food production shock hindered food 
import and distribution programs as roads, bridges, railway lines and other means of 
transport were washed away.  Thus, the vast majority of Malawians who lived in rural 
areas faced two problems in accessing food: sheer lack at the local level as a result of the 
production shock and limited penetration of imports in rural areas due to transportation 
problems as well as rising prices, which steadily put maize beyond the reach of the poor. 
 
                                                 
4 The political causes behind this event will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.   6
4.2  The ‘political’ explanation: SGR mismanagement, erroneous IMF advice, delayed 
donor response 
This analysis emphasizes the misguided policies and practices of the government and the 
donor community, and the role they played in exacerbating the food crisis. Perhaps the 
most pressing question in this vein is how or why the National Food Reserve Agency 
(NFRA)—whose mandate it is to maintain adequate buffer stocks of grain in order to 
protect Malawians from fluctuations in food production, availability and prices—sold 
almost all of the SGR. The SGR was originally managed by ADMARC, the agricultural 
marketing parastatal in Malawi, but the IMF, EU and other donors felt that the national 
grain reserves would be better managed if it was run independently on a cost-recovery 
basis. This inspired the creation of NFRA in 1999. However, the NFRA was not 
capitalized and this prompted the organization to take loans from commercial and 
government banks to purchase 167,000 MT of maize from ADMARC in 1999. In the 
words of one donor official: “The decision for a commercial loan to be taken to capitalize 
the NFRA—that was a crazy decision” (cited in Devereux 2002a:9).  
 
By July 2000, food stocks held by ADMARC or the NFRA were near the full storage 
capacity of 180,000 MT, standing at 174,406 MT. The NFRA had borrowed MK600 
million to purchase maize at an interest rate of 56 percent per annum. By June 2000, the 
debt had skyrocketed to approximately MK 1 billion. This combined with the high level 
of grain stock raised questions about fiscal costs and sustainability on the part of donors, 
leading to mounting pressure from the government and donors to repay the loan. The 
IMF, in particular, argued that holding what it termed “excess stock” was too expensive 
and concurred with the World Bank in its assertion that NFRA operations risked 
distorting the market. The IMF subsequently advised the NFRA to sell some of the SGR 
to service its debt. However, 1999 and 2000 were bumper harvest years and it was 
impossible to sell excess stock without incurring heavy losses. By September 2000, the 
grain reserve still stood at 131,000 MT and the NFRA felt the urgent need to sell some of 
this to service its debt, pay its staff (since the organization was not capitalized) and also 
because the maize was old and storage losses were high. The IMF therefore encouraged 
NFRA to export the grain rather than dump it on local markets, which would depress 
prices further and act as disincentives to producers and traders. As a result, NFRA 
exported 5,000 MT of SGR maize to Mozambique and sold a further 30,000 MT to 
Kenya in April-May 2001. Some blamed this controversial decision for the subsequent 
food crisis that occurred.  
 
In response, the IMF maintains that it did not advice the government to sell all of its 
stock, but merely to reduce the level of reserve to between 30,000 MT and 60,000 MT. 
The only concession provided was that the recommendation it gave to the Government of 
Malawi was predicated on “wrong information” it received about crop production. The 
Fund had anticipated sales of the SGR to be replenished through local purchases after the 
2001 harvest—which at the time was forecast to be adequate. In short: “the advice would 
have been correct if the information was correct” (quoted in Devereux 2002a:10). 
Nevertheless, Devereux (2002a:10) argues that the IMF displayed “remarkable 
insensitivity and ideological narrow-mindedness in the Concluding Statement of its 
Mission in May 2002, which resolved to withhold disbursement of US$47 million to   7
Malawi.”  In fact, people were already beginning to die of starvation by the time the IMF 
denied disbursement of these funds. The government accused the IMF of causing the 
famine, while the IMF pointed the finger at government for corruption, before finally 
admitting that it had perhaps behaved with some degree of insensitivity (Patel and 
Delwiche 2002).  
 
Regardless, most of the SGR maize was sold in the first half of 2001, with ADMARC 
and NFRA deciding not to purchase any more maize in the 2000/01 season as this would 
incur costly storage costs, which were seen as unnecessary, since it was believed that 
market supplies of food were adequate. It was alleged that some maize held by 
ADMARC was sold to private traders and others, without NFRA’s knowledge or consent 
(Devereux 2002a). Indeed, the next effect of the sale was to benefit private traders who 
bought the maize at a cheap rate and hoarded it until prices rose, before reselling it at 
inflated prices.  
 
Donor-government relations were also terse at this time, as a result of donor claims of 
economic mismanagement and governance failures. It is further alleged that the donors 
delayed responding to the impending crisis, as relations with the Government of Malawi 
had soured during 2001 due to contention over a number of governance issues—one of 
which was how the SGR had been emptied. In fact, the IMF withheld balance of payment 
support, DFID, the EU and USAID suspended development assistance, and Denmark 
terminated its development projects and withdrew from Malawi entirely. Much of these 
suspensions were based on the belief that corruption and fraud were rampant in 
government,
5 though these could not have occurred at a worse time for Malawi. In fact, it 
was only after reports of starvation-related deaths had been published by the media that 
the donors reversed their hard-line stance and offered food aid without condition.  
 
5.  Continuing saga: The 2005 food crisis 
There is far less information on the causes and consequences of the recent 2005 food 
crisis than there is on the 2001/02 famine in Malawi. It is estimated, however, that at least 
4.7 million people, or a third of the population, were effected and in need of food 
assistance (Phiri 2006). The hardest hit segments of the population were women and 
children: 2.2 million of the 4.7 million affected were children under the age of 18—
750,000 of which were children under five years—according to the Malawi Vulnerability 
Assessment Committee (MVAC), an umbrella of government and donor representatives 
(Phiri 2006). A charity organization, SOS Children’s Villages (2005) further reports: 
 
One reason for this crisis is that crops died when the rains failed, and as a result, maize prices have 
doubled, making food unaffordable for millions. Malawi is also experiencing an HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
meaning people are spending what little money they have on medicine rather than food. 
 
This marked the sixth year in a row that Malawi grappled with the problem of hunger, 
with aid agencies attributing the food shortages to drought and bad agricultural practices. 
In response, the WFP scaled up its relief food distribution from 1.5 million people to 2.4 
                                                 
5 In fact, this belief originated in July 2000, when the parliamentary Public Accounts Committee published 
a critical report on corruption and fraud within government.    8
million by January 2006. However, civil society groups urged the government and donors 
to do more than just provide emergency food aid if they hoped to find a long-term 
solution to the recurring problem of food shortage. For example, Mabvuto Bamusi, the 
National Coordinator for the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), a lobby group 
monitoring the impact of the state’s social and economic policies on the poor, urged the 
government to build irrigation infrastructure and to invest in the agricultural sector in 
general, to mitigate vulnerability in the longer-term. She further states:  
 
Irrigation alone is not enough. It must be supported with a comprehensive input program under which 
farmers receive seed and fertilizer before planting. So far, government’s planning has been disastrous 
(Quoted in Phiri 2006). 
 
6.  A brief overview of social protection measures in Malawi 
Given the chronic vulnerability of the famine-affected in Malawi and the repeated calls 
for reform of government policy resulting from the continuing food shortage problem, it 
is essential to analyze existing social protection measures in the country. During the 
famine, it was reported that 15 percent of households received food-based assistance 
from extended family members and only 19 percent obtained food aid from outside 
sources such as NGOs (Bryceson and Fonseca 2006). Most households were forced to 
fend for themselves (Bryceson and Fonseca 2006). In this context, social protection 
measures can be especially important policy instruments to mitigate vulnerability.   
 
According to Devereux (2006:7), social protection policy in Malawi has been marked by 
“diversity and lack of continuity.” More interventions have been tested in Malawi than in 
any other country in southern Africa, though these remain projects rather than 
institutionalized programs. Many are abandoned after several years (for example, starter 
packs) and still others are re-introduced years later (i.e. fertilizer subsidies). The National 
Safety Nets Programme (NSNP), implemented in 2000 under Malawi’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy, for example, was designed to provide assets to the economically 
active who face livelihood constraints due to poverty or market failure, as well as to grant 
food or cash transfers to the economically inactive, people who face livelihood shocks, 
and marginalized groups. The NSNP has only been partially successful as a result of a 
lack of financial and management capacity and a tendency to “experiment with a range of 
ad hoc, small scale and short term interventions rather than a coherent, coordinated and 
sustained set of nationally owned social protection measures” (Devereux 2006:7). These 
projects can be categorized as productivity enhancing safety nets (free inputs distribution, 
fertilizer subsidies, public works), or as direct welfare transfers (food or cash transfers to 
poor and vulnerable people) (Devereux 2006). 
 
  Productivity-enhancing safety nets 
In Malawi, productivity-enhancing safety nets include free input distribution (e.g. starter 
packs), fertilizer subsidies, and public works programs, typically funded by DFID, the 
EU, USAID and the World Bank. Advocates of starter packs and fertilizer subsides point 
out that supporting food production in the country is more cost-effective than subsidizing 
food consumption through food aid. Detractors, meanwhile, claim that subsidized or free 
input distribution distorts markets, undermines trade, are fiscally unsustainable and tend 
to leak to wealthier farmers, estates and neighboring countries (Devereux 2006).   9
Targeting these transfers is often fraught with problems and prone to politicization. 
However, Devereux points out that until access to affordable inputs can be assured 
through the market, input subsidies or handouts may be the only option.   
 
In fact, between 1998—when the starter pack program was initiated—and 2000, maize 
production in Malawi increased by an average of 125-150 kg per household and total 
production reached approximately 2.5 million tones each year—500,000 tones higher 
than ever before or since, and 67 percent higher than the twenty-year average (Blackie 
2006). At its most successful in 2000, the starter pack contributed 16 percent to the 
national maize harvest, keeping maize prices affordable. The program also proved more 
cost effective than blanket fertilizer subsidies and subsidized commercial food imports, 
whilst discouraging dependence. Moreover, it had the potential to form the basis of a 
long-term development plan (Blackie 2006). However, after two years, the program was 
altered: instead of providing seeds and fertilizer best suited to local conditions and 
economic circumstances (‘best bets’), it began to provide the cheapest and most readily 
available (Blackie 2006). This change was meant to assist very poor people produce at 
least some extra food, but it diminished the potential of the program as a development 
tool to reduce chronic food insecurity. Ironically, much of this transformation was 
because key donors viewed the original pack as disrupting agricultural input markets. In 
reality, few recipients were involved with these markets as they were too poor (Blackie 
2006).  
 
Meanwhile, public works programs are self-targeting and in Malawi, food-for-work, 
cash-for-work and inputs-for-work have all been piloted. However, these have had mixed 
results, as labor-constrained households are unable to take full advantage of these 
programs, and the assets created as a result of these programs are often of low quality and 
badly maintained (Devereux and Macauslan 2006).  
 
  Direct welfare transfers 
Direct welfare transfers encompass emergency food aid, targeted nutrition programs, 
school feeding schemes and unconditional cash transfers to the poor and vulnerable. 
Later assessments demonstrated that food aid distributed in Malawi in 2002 was poorly 
targeted on impoverished drought-affected households, though well targeted towards 
orphans and female-headed households—that is, vulnerable sectors of society considered 
“easily visible” (Sharma 2005).  Meanwhile, evidence from Malawi has shown that 
targeted nutrition programs are ineffective when compared to results garnered from other 
social protection measures, and these have done little to address the underlying causes of 
food insecurity (Devereux 2006). Nevertheless, supplementary and therapeutic feeding 
continues to be a component of the Ministry of Health’s social safety net scheme, with 
38,000 malnourished children, orphan carers and pregnant/lactating mothers falling under 
the policy ambit in 2003/04. School feeding has also been promoted in Malawi—though 
this is viewed as an education intervention rather than as a nutrition intervention 
(Devereux 2006).  
 
Finally, Malawi has had limited experience with direct cash transfers. In 2001/02, a pilot 
project was launched wherein cash, vouchers (to buy goods at local stores), or a basket of   10
commodities (maize-flour, blankets, etc.), were distributed to households in 54 villages. 
Vouchers were the least effective method to mitigate vulnerability as they were both 
expensive to administer and tended to distort the market, with some retailers raising 
prices to maximize profits. Meanwhile, cash transfers on their own also proved 
problematic because food prices skyrocket during the hungry season, when staple foods 
were scarce. Thus, in order to protect household entitlements to food, a ‘food plus cash’ 
approach might be most suitable, as it would allow vulnerable sectors of the population to 
meet their subsistence requirements—both in terms of nutritional and non-nutritional 
needs—regardless of instances of market failure. In fact, Concern Worldwide 
implemented such a project
6 in three districts of Malawi during the 2005/06 food crisis. 
From January to April 2006, 5,050 beneficiaries received a monthly package of food 
(20kg maize, 4kg beans, 1 litre oil) and some amount of cash depending on household 
size (Devereux, Mvula and Solomon 2006). A final evaluation paired with regular 
monitoring showed that the FACT project was successful in meeting its stated objectives: 
much of the food was consumed and most of the cash was used to buy staple food, 
though some money was also spent on non-food essentials. FACT beneficiaries were also 
able to save some cash to invest in fertilizers and small stock (Devereux, Mvula and 
Solomon 2006).  
 
7. Policy gaps and potential direction for future action  
All in all, vulnerability in Malawi is particularly acute due to the disproportionate impact 
of the 2001/02 food crisis and the food insecurity that persists as a result of severe land 
pressure, making the achievement of self-sufficiency difficult for most households, even 
during good harvest years. Moreover, the termination of fertilizer subsidies threatened 
peasant households’ subsistence food production even further, whilst opportunities to 
earn off-farm income are remain limited. In fact, rural income diversification—a 
significant sign of “depeasantization—has been proceeding in Malawi without the aid of 
the relatively secure subsistence fallback that smallholder households have relied on so 
heavily in other African countries (Bryceson 2002 paraphrased in Bryceson and Fonseca 
2006). Moreover, the weakness of maize markets in a context of high market dependence 
for food compounds the problem as sudden severe price hikes keep food out of the hands 
of the poor during the hungry season. Under these conditions, either markets have to be 
strengthened such that inter-seasonal food price fluctuations are less acute, or vulnerable 
households have to be protected against market failures with food aid or cash transfers 
that account for rising food prices—as in Concern Worldwide’s FACT project. In fact, 
social protection is a crucial policy concern in Malawi.  
 
Overall, it is evident that two sets of problems need to be addressed in the country: 
livelihood vulnerability and institutional vulnerability. Livelihood vulnerability can 
ultimately only be redressed through socio-economic development. This requires support 
for policies that directly or indirectly raises the incomes of poor households and 
diversifies or stabilizes their food sources in order to reduce food security risks. 
Employment creation programs and policy initiatives designed to enhance access to 
agricultural inputs are examples of direct measures to mitigate this form of vulnerability.  
                                                 
6 The ‘food and cash transfers’ project (FACT).    11
Indirect measures include education to improve the prospects for Malawians to find non-
farm employment, thus reducing the dependence on rain-fed agriculture.  
 
Meanwhile, institutional vulnerability is best tackled through institution-building and 
strengthening the ability of government to design and implement sound, pro-poor 
policies. The two most important policy-making institutions at the centre of the crisis in 
2001/02 were the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Government of Malawi. 
The IMF at the time encouraged Malawi to undergo agricultural liberalization but it is 
clear from IMF documents that the government was unwilling to implement aspects of 
the agricultural liberalization program. However, it was caught with the need to access 
balance of payments supports and yielded to IMF demands. Yet, as an ActionAid Policy 
Brief (2002) puts it, the willingness to accept inappropriate policy reforms in the final 
instance and an inability to formulate policy alternatives makes them equally 
responsible.” The exchange between the IMF and the government of Malawi during the 
food famine in 2001/02 clearly demonstrates that there is a need to integrate 
macroeconomic and sectoral policy reforms with adequate social protection measures. 
Further in this vein, three key policy areas to discuss and target in a field-based research 
exercise might be: the management of the SGR, the future of the Starter Pack
7 program 
and the concept of the right to food and its implementation. Specific areas for research 
could include: 
•  The evidence about the pattern and timing of food insecurity and its implications 
for improving estimates of food aid requirements and targeting aid effectively.  
•  The effectiveness of free inputs as a transitional (medium-term) food security 
measure in the context of agricultural liberalization in an extremely poor country.  
•  The possibility of using the packs to promote crop diversification, thereby moving 
away from over-dependence on maize and boosting smallholder incomes.  
As an end note, it is worth pointing out some small progress has occurred: it has been 
reported that the government plans to increase spending towards irrigation projects in its 
2006/2007 budget. Finance Minster Goodall Gondwe stated: “The next budget will be 
more agricultural with emphasis on irrigation and dams. We are also looking at 
commercialization of a good deal of the agricultural sector in 2006” (quoted in Phiri 
2006). Gondwe is also optimistic about Malawi’s expected growth target: the 2005/2006 
budget forecasted economic growth of 8.2 percent, contingent on good weather 
conditions. He claimed this target was attainable due to large-scale investment in the 
fertilizer subsidy that the government undertook in 2005, as well as by the expected 
increase in allocation of funds to agriculture in the 2006/2007 budget (Phiri 2006).   
                                                 
7 The main constraint on agricultural production in Malawi has been limited access to inputs (i.e. fertilizer, 
seeds, credit). In this context, the Starter Pack—or Targeted Inputs Programme—was initiated in 1998 to 
contribute towards the national harvest and household food security by disbursing a small pack of improved 
seeds and fertilizers to small farmers. While this approach was successful for two years, as evidenced by 
rising maize production, the structure of the program was changed: it went from providing seeds and 
fertilizer best suited to local environmental and economic circumstances ('best bets') to handing out 
whatever was cheap and available. This change was aimed at helping very poor people produce at least 
some extra food, but the program was no longer a development tool to reduce chronic food insecurity. It 
changed because the original pack was seen by key donors as disrupting agricultural input markets.   12
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